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INTRODUCTION

So often in its first century has the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit led the nation in the articulation of legal principles
that it comes as no surprise to us when it does so again. But we
pay a price for our expectations. As readers of Second Circuit opinions, we become jaded by the court's accomplishments-as if Ricky
Henderson added one more stolen base to his record or Pete Rose
eked out yet another hit.
Some decisions that are recognized in their own field as being
of the highest significance consequently fail to receive the more
general legal recognition they deserve. In this offering I discuss one
such case-a ruling, both creative and controversial, of the Court
of Appeals in 1977 which remains a landmark in both libel law and
first amendment law and which typifies, in my view, the extraordinary vision of the Second Circuit.1
I. Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.
Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc.,2 was a libel case
that addressed an intriguing constitutional issue: when a newspaper publishes an article containing a false and defamatory charge
made by one prominent public figure about another, can the newspaper itself be held liable if it did not endorse the charge and if it
did not believe it? The last element of the question brings the is* Partner, Cahill Gordon & Reindel.

Cynical readers may be slow to accept my assurance that my role as victorious counsel
in the case had nothing to do with my selection of it for adulation in this offering. The case,
as lawyers say, speaks for itself; so, I hope, will this piece.
2 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
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sue outside the realm of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan;3 for all
the constitutional protection afforded by that case to vindicate this
nation's "commitment" to "uninhibited, robust" debate, one type
of defamatory speech not protected by Sullivan is a false statement of fact voiced with knowledge of its falsity or with serious
doubts as to its truth. The moment a journalist testifies that he did
not believe what he wrote was true, or the moment a jury decides,
regardless of what the journalist testifies, that he wrote something
he knew or suspected was untrue, Sullivan protection ends.
But that is the background for Edwards, not its resolution.
What if the false statement was published simply because of the
position or authority of the speaker? Or because of the newsworthy
character of the charges? And suppose the newspaper does not endorse the charge at all, but simply reports it, fairly and dispassionately? It is these questions that Edwards addressed and answered.
The facts of Edwards involved little dispute.5 The litigation
originated in the heated controversy over the effects of the insecticide DDT. Officials of the National Audubon Society (the "Society") were concerned that pro-DDT scientists were distorting an
increase in the Society's annual "Christmas Bird Count" statistics
in an effort to minimize the apparent impact of DDT. In a foreword to an issue of the Society's magazine reporting the latest
bird-count results, the Society stated that anyone relying on such
results as suggesting that there were more birds (rather than more
bird watchers) "is being paid to lie, or is parroting something he
knows little about."6 A New York Times reporter read the foreword, and asked the Audubon official for the names of those the
Society considered "paid liars." A second Audubon official furnished five names, 7 under circumstances that were disputed at
trial.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id. at 270.
6 The factual summary of Edwards here is similar to that in an article a partner of
mine and I wrote analyzing Edwards' first half-decade. See Abrams & Ringel, "Edwards"
After 5 Years - Neutral Reporting and Libel Law, N.Y.L.J., April 26, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
6 Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117.
' The issues at trial were whether the second official had cautioned the first that the
3
4

individuals he named were simply persistent misusers of bird count data rather than paid
liars, and whether the first official passed this along to the Times' reporter. In returning a
verdict against the official who originally provided the names, but not the official passing
them on to the reporter, the jury seemingly concluded that no such limitation had been
placed on the description of the individuals.
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The reporter then made an effort to contact the scientists in
question. He reached three of them and each hotly denied the
charges, one referring to the charges as "almost libelous."8 The
Times article, as published, summarized the foreword and stated
that the Audubon official subsequently had identified five scientists. The article noted that those scientists reached had "ridiculed
the accusations as 'emotional,' 'hysterical,' and unfounded" and
quoted, as well, the remark that "they were 'almost libelous.',
A libel suit was brought against the Times, the Audubon Society and the two Audubon officials on behalf of three of the scientists. The district court held that the scientists were public figures
and, applying the Sullivan standard, refused to grant summary
judgment to the Times, finding that the Times could be liable if
the reporter "had serious doubts about the truth of the statement
that the appellees were paid liars, even if he did not have any
doubt that he was reporting [the official's] allegations faithfully."' 10
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs against the Times
and one Audubon official, and an appeal was taken.
The Second Circuit reversed, holding the judgment against the
Times to be "constitutionally impermissible." In the pivotal paragraph of the opinion (holding, additionally, that actual malice, as
defined by Sullivan, had not been proved), Chief Judge Kaufman
wrote:
Succinctly stated, when a responsible, prominent organization
like the National Audubon Society makes serious charges against
a public figure, the First Amendment protects the accurate and
disinterested reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity. What is newsworthy about such accusations is that they were made. We do not
believe that the press may be required under the First Amendment to suppress newsworthy statements merely because it has
serious doubts regarding their truth. Nor must the press take up
cudgels against dubious charges in order to publish them without
fear of liability for defamation. The public interest in being fully
informed about controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the freedom to report
such charges without assuming responsibility for them.1
Edwards, 556 F.2d at 117.
g Id. at 118.
10

Id. at 119.

Id. at 120 (citations omitted). Chief Judge Kaufman's opinion was joined by Tom C.
Clark, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court (retired) and William I. Jameson, Senior
1
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The court went on to note that "[l]iteral accuracy is not a prerequisite," merely that the "journalist believe[d], reasonably and
in good faith, that his report accurately conveys the charges
made.' 1 2 Conversely, "a publisher who in fact espouses or concurs
in the charges made by others, or who deliberately distorts these
statements to launch a personal attack of his own... cannot rely
on a privilege of neutral reportage" and "assumes responsibility for
the underlying accusations."' 3
Applying these principles, the court held that the Times' report of the charge was fair and accurate and did not espouse the
Society's position. The opinion noted that the Times article re4
ported the scientists' "outraged reactions in the same article.'
Concluding that the article "was the exemplar of fair and dispassionate reporting of an unfortunate but newsworthy contretemps,"
15
it "held that it was privileged under the First Amendment.'

II. PosT-Edwards CASE LAW
The core principal of Edwards seems self-evidently correct.
Why, for instance, should a journalist or newspaper be at any risk
of being held liable simply for reporting on the reckless charge
made by Senator Alan Simpson that CNN reporter Peter Arnett
was an Iraqi "sympathizer"?' 6 Why should this law review be subject to a libel action because I have, in my last sentence, repeated
the charge without believing a word of it?
Of course, real lawsuits arise out of more mundane events.
Consider the following: a journalist reports about criminal charges
said to have been brought against the son of an incumbent Town
Supervisor then being challenged for reelection by a councilman.
According to the councilman (as quoted by the journalist), the Supervisor had removed him from the police-liaison role he had been
playing for "political reasons and possibly because the town police
had arrested [the Supervisor's] son last month.' 7 The Chief of Police confirms the supposed arrest to the reporter, who is also told
District Judge, both sitting by designation.
1" Id. (citations omitted).
" Id.
14

Id.

(citations omitted).

25 Id.

"6See N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at A18, col. 1.
" Hogan v. Herald Co., 84 A.D.2d 470, 472, 446 N.Y.S.2d 836, 838 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 58
N.Y.2d 630, 444 N.E.2d 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1982).
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by the Town Justice that the case will be heard in a few weeks.
These matters are reported, as is the denial of the Supervisor that
he had intervened to influence the outcome of the case or whether
his son would face any trial at all.
The truth, it turns out, is this: although an appearance ticket
charging the son with criminal mischief in the fourth degree had
been issued by the police, affidavits had been filed denying the
charge, the appearance ticket was never served, and the son was
never arrested. All this, according to the Supervisor, he had told
the newspaper prior to publication.
On these facts, the Fourth Department of the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. It concluded that by publishing without sufficient investigation the
charge of one candidate over the denial by the other, in a bitterly
contested election, the newspaper opened the determination of its
culpability to jury scrutiny. Edwards itself was rejected as authority, a rejection apparently affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 8 In good part, the rejection of Edwards seemed based on
the notion that it was unacceptable that there should be no remedy for the Supervisor in a situation in which he could have lost
the election based upon false charges made against him."9
18The Court of Appeals affirmed simply "for reasons stated" by the lower appellate
court. See Hogan, 58 N.Y.2d at 630, 444 N.E.2d at 1002, 458 N.Y.S.2d at 538. Edwards has
met both acceptance and rejection around the country. It has been approved in, for example, Ward v. News Group Int'l, Ltd, 733 F. Supp. 83, 84 (C.D. Cal. 1990); Sunshine Sportswear & Elecs., Inc. v. WSOC Television, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 1499, 1510 (D.S.C. 1989); Barry
v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124-25 (N.D. Cal. 1984); McCracken v. Gainesville Tribune, Inc., 146 Ga. App. 274, 275, 246 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1978); Krauss v. Champaign News
Gazette, Inc., 59 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747, 375 N.E.2d 1362, 1363 (1978); J.V. Peters & Co. v.
Knight Ridder Co., 10 Media L. Rep. 1577, 1580-81 (BNA) (Ohio Ct. App. 1984). Among the
decisions rejecting the notion of a neutral reportage privilege are Dickey v. CBS, Inc., 583
F.2d 1221, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1978) (dictum) (modified somewhat in dictum in Medico v.
Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 145 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981)); Tunney v. American Broadcasting Co., 109 Ill. App. 3d 769, 777-78, 441 N.E.2d 86, 92 (1982); McCall v.
Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 886-87 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 975 (1982); Postill v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 118 Mich. App. 608, 622, 325 N.W.2d
511, 517-18 (1982); Janklow v. Viking Press, 378 N.W.2d 875, 881 (S.D. 1985); see also Note,
The Developing Privilege of Neutral Reportage, 69 VA. L. REv. 853, 863-65 (1983) (collecting pre-1983 cases embracing, disavowing, limiting, or otherwise interpreting Edwards).
19 See Hogan, 84 A.D.2d at 476, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 840-41. As a factual matter, the outrage of the court at this prospect was thoroughly misplaced, as it was not the Supervisor
himself, but the Supervisor's son who was the plaintiff in the action. Ironically, had the
court kept its eye on the true plaintiff, it could have disposed of the defendant's claim of
privilege with the simple observation that because the Supervisor's son was a private figure
(a fact found by the court), Edwardswas irrelevant. See Edwards, 556 F.2d at 120 (privilege
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Edwards takes a different tack, maintaining that a critical
function of the press, at best, is to report charges and countercharges made by candidates for public office and that the press
should not be obliged to decide between them in order to be safe
from potential libel liability.
The division of post-Edwards authority about whether to
adopt the ruling seems based on a variety of factors. One, exemplified in Hogan, is the reluctance of some courts to leave a defamed
libel plaintiff with no remedy at all against the press. A related one
is the sense of some courts that the press has already received sufficient-perhaps more than appropriate-protection in Sullivan.20
A third is that Edwards deviates too starkly from the hoary common-law rule that one who republished a libelous statement is as
21
responsible as the original publisher.

My own view is that although any republication (let alone
magnification) of a libel may inflict grievous harm on the unjustly
wounded party, a rule of law which prevents the public from learning about the frequently overheated debate of powerful individuals
and forces in our society inflicts unacceptable harm on society itself. The charges in Hogan were important; they bore upon the
competence of both candidates for public office. For the press to
ignore these charges-or, worse yet, to refuse to publish them because one or another of the candidates seemed unpersuasive-requires an unacceptable form of press censorship on
candidates.
As for the contention that Sullivan already provides the press
with more than ample protection, the reality is that in this area it
provides none at all. Sullivan itself may be the subject of attack; if
so, the solution is to deal with Sullivan-caused problems, not to
refuse to extend first amendment protection when it is needed and
otherwise justifiable.
As noted earlier, Edwards itself was limited in its protective
scope to charges made by a "responsible prominent organization"
against public figures. While these elements of Edwards have led
protects accurate, disinterested republication of charges against public figures).
20 See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publishing Co., 639 F.2d 54, 70 (2d Cir. 1980)(press
adequately protected by Sullivan burden of proof); Postill, 118 Mich. App. at 622, 325
N.W.2d at 518 (same); Janklow, 378 N.W.2d at 881 (same).
21 See RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 578
(1938); Note, supra note 18, at 853-55.
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to a debate of their own,2 2 it plainly reflects an effort to protect
private figures from unjust attacks and even to limit the category
of individuals who may be freely quoted by a journalist in a disinterested manner without fear of libel damages.

III. Edwards AND

FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

Perhaps the most striking reality suggested by Edwards is
that its central issue was novel when decided in 1977 and remains
unresolved today. Although efforts have been made to raise the issue before the Supreme Court,23 the Court has yet to grant certiorari in any such case. In fact, in the one case in which Edwards
might have been argued to the Court, counsel expressly disclaimed
24
any reliance on it.
Like Sullivan itself, Edwards is best understood as a first
amendment ruling rather than one rooted in libel law. The interre22

Courts disagree about whether the Edwardsprivilege is limited by the characteristics

of the original defamer. Compare Postill, 118 Mich. App. at 622, 325 N.W.2d at 517 (defendant invoking neutral reportage privilege must prove original defamer was "responsible
and prominent organization") and Rand v. New York Times Co., 4 Media L. Rep. 1556,
1558 (BNA) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (privilege inapplicable because defendant himself is not
responsible prominent organization) with Ward, 733 F. Supp. at 84 (trustworthiness of original defamer not issue; privilege granted though some of original defamers were individuals)
and Barry, 584 F. Supp. at 1126 ("neutral reportage privilege does not depend solely upon
the 'trustworthiness' of the individual or organization making the allegedly defamatory
statements") (emphasis added).
There is also a split in the courts with respect to the required characteristics of the
victim. Compare Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631 (10th Cir. 1977) (privilege
inapplicable because plaintiff not public figure) and Crane v. Arizona Republic, 729 F.
Supp. 698, 710 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (same) with April v. Reflector-Herald, Inc., 46 Ohio App. 3d
95, 98, 546 N.E.2d 466, 469 (1988) ("no legitimate difference" exists between public and
private figure plaintiffs for purposes of privilege).
23 See Celebrezze v. Netzley, No. 53864-53865 (Ohio Ct. App., Aug. 4, 1988)(LEXIS,
States library, Ohio file)(granting privilege to defendant newspaper and reporter), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 51 Ohio St. 3d 89, 554 N.E.2d 1292, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 428
(1990); DiSalle v. P.G. Publishing Co., 375 Pa. Super. 510, 545, 544 A.2d 1345, 1363 (1988)
(if privilege does exist, it would not apply to defendant newspaper on facts of this case),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3216 (1989).
2 In Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., concurring), the Court reviewed a district court decision, affirmed by the Sixth Circuit,
that, inter alia, declined to apply the neutral reportage privilege to the defendant newspaper because the alleged original defamer was an individual rather than a "responsible, prominent organization." See id. at 660 n.1. Inexplicably, the newspaper elected not to argue the
point in its appeals of its libel conviction. See id. at 694 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In his
opinion concurring with the majority's decision to affirm the judgments below, Justice
Blackmun observed that the defendant's choice not to rely on the privilege "appears to have
been unwise ....
Were this Court to adopt the neutral reportage theory, the facts of this
case arguably might fit within it." Id. at 694-95 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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lationship of first amendment principles to other areas of law remains controversial.2 5 In Edwards, the principle established by the
Second Circuit seems so essential to the preservation of first
amendment rights that even a judiciary disinclined to take expansively protective views of the Bill of Rights should-or, at least,
ought to-find it persuasive.
That Edwards should be of such significance is, as I have said,
consistent with the Second Circuit's leadership role in legal development. Perhaps surprisingly, it is less consistent with the court's
previous perspective in first amendment cases.
In libel law, in the days well before New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan 26 placed first amendment limits on libel recoveries, a Second Circuit ruling of Judges Chase and Learned Hand in an action
commenced by a member of Congress, sternly rejected the notion
that any degree of error was worthy of first amendment protection. 27 "Freedom of speech," the court concluded (in terms precisely contrary to Sullivan's later holding) 28 "is, as it has always
25

See, e.g., New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 585-96 (2d

Cir. 1989) (Oakes, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's fair use analysis), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990); Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 977-80 (2d Cir. 1977) (affording first
amendment privilege to journalists exercise of editorial control and judgment), rev'd, 441
U.S. 153 (1979); Abrams, FirstAmendment and Copyright, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y OF U.S.A.
1, 1-12 (1987) (reconciling first amendment with copyright principles); Miner, Exploiting
Stolen Text: Fair Use or Foul Play?, 37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y oF U.S.A. 1, 6-8 (1989) (advocating total elimination of fair use doctrine for unpublished or undisseminated works).
28 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27 Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 316 U.S. 642 (1942). The Sweeney case was one of approximately 70 suits brought in different districts around the country by Congressman Martin
Sweeney against columnists Drew Pearson and Roger Allen and the news service and newspapers that published their column. By the time that the Supreme Court heard arguments
in the case, first amendment claims had been made which were generally similar in nature
to those later made and adopted in Sullivan. See Rosenberg, Taking a Look at "The Distorted Shape of An Ugly Tree" Efforts at Policy Surgery on the Law of Libel During the
Decade of the 1940's, 15 N. Ky. L. REv. 11, 19-30 (1988). Although the case, as Professor
Rosenberg has observed, "quickly faded into historical oblivion," the 4-4 division of the
Supreme Court "refutes any notion that the Warren Court Justices [in Sullivan] were suddenly inventing new constitutional questions and upsetting well-grounded defamation doctrine." Id. at 30.
28 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in
amount-leads to a comparable "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of
truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that only
false speech will be deterred. Even courts accepting this defense as an adequate
safeguard have recognized the difficulties of adducing legal proofs that the alleged
libel was true in all its factual particulars. Under such a rule, would-be critics of
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been, freedom to tell the truth and comment fairly upon facts and
not a license to spread damaging falsehoods in the guise of news
gathering and its dissemination."2 9 Judge Clark's dissenting opinion urged the majority to afford protection to statements amounting to "comment and inference" and to avoid putting the burden
of proof in such cases on the libel defendant.30 The Supreme
Court's later ruling in Sullivan was in accord with-and went far
beyond-such views. The majority was unpersuaded.
Nor was the Second Circuit persuaded that first amendment
principles protected Communist Party leaders convicted under the
Smith Act.31 The case, involving charges of "conspiracy to advocate" the overthrow of the United States government, raised a
flurry of constitutionally thorny issues. Read forty years later,
however, what is most jarring is the most famous contribution of
Learned Hand, while on the circuit court, to the development of
first amendment law: his recharacterization of the Holmes-Brandeis "clear and present danger" test as one in which "[iln each
case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 32 The Supreme Court, in Chief Justice
33
Vinson's Dennis opinion, later adopted the Hand reformulation
and has, on occasion, repeated it. 4 But it is no more persuasive-and surely no more protective of first amendment rights-for
its repetition.
Whatever the clarity (or "gravity") of the danger posed within
the United States by the American Communist Party in 1948
(when the Dennis indictment was rendered), there was hardly any
"present" danger at all posed by the Party; "miserable merchants
of unwanted ideas" they were (as Justice Douglas observed), whose
official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is

believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to
make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule thus
dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with
the first and fourteenth amendments.
Id. (citations omitted).
29 Sweeney, 122 F.2d at 291.

30 Id. at 292 (Clark, J., dissenting).
'" United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 234 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
22 Id. at 212.
See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 510.
24 See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
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Only by abandoning the requirement

that the danger posed by their speech be not only plain but imminent could the convictions be sustained. But by doing so, Judge
Hand (and Chief Justice Vinson as well) strayed far from Justice
Brandeis's classic exhortation that:
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It
is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
36

one.

Judge Hand's refraining of the clear and present danger test
was inconsistent not only with that of its eminent drafters but with
the far more libertarian (and speech-protective) views Hand had
articulated as a district judge over the previous three decades.37 In
an opinion honored by legal scholars throughout the years, 8 Hand
had written an opinion dealing with the recurrent and delicate
problem of the relationship of freedom of expression to the Espionage Act of 1917. Rendered during World War I, Hand's opinion
was both "elegant" 39 and persuasive and provided far more protection than Holmes's later crafted "clear and present danger" test.
The elder Hand's opinion in Dennis was far less speech-protective.
Nor, to cite a final example, was the brief per curiam reversal
by a 5-3 vote of the court of appeals in New York Times Co. v.
United States4 0-the Pentagon Papers Case. Faced with a ruling
by District Judge Murray Gurfein that the United States had
failed to demonstrate that the Times's publication during the
Vietnamese conflict of a highly classified historical study commis11 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 589 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 538-39 (D.C.N.Y.), rev'd, 246
F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)(magazine's pictorial and textual critique of war fell within the right to
criticize normally privileged in country protecting free expression of opinion).
31 See H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 125-30
(1988); Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine:
Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 passim (1975).
3 H. KALVEN, supra note 38, at 126.
40 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
'
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sioned by the government,41 sufficiently harmed the nation, the
court's slim majority voted to reverse and remand to the district
court for further consideration. To be sure, the court's majority did
no more than require further hearings by the district court and
even went so far as to require them on an expedited basis. But in
the context of an ongoing prior restraint on the press, the delay
ordered by the court was a serious blow to the principle that prior
restraints on speech are not only disfavored but that they require
the most powerful showing before they will be seriously entertained.4 2 The Second Circuit majority was slow to recognize this,
slower certainly than the Supreme Court which speedily granted a
writ of certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit, reinstating
43
Judge Gurfein's ruling.

Although I can scarcely conceal my dubiety about the court's
rulings in each of these cases, I do not cite them for the proposition that they were wrongly decided. Rightly or wrongly decided,
they do fairly reflect the general attitude of the Second Circuit in
its first amendment rulings during the earlier part of its first century-careful, able, and serious rulings, all, but none exhibiting
particular sympathy for the constitutional claims presented to it

44

It is no surprise that the Second Circuit's attitude has changed
with the times. Not only has Supreme Court case law changed generally through the years, but in the first amendment area in particular it has changed to an extraordinary degree. Law school courses
on first amendment topics are often taught with almost exclusive
reference to Supreme Court decisions commencing with Sullivan
and focusing on the generally protective rulings of the 1970's and
1980's. With Edwards, the Second Circuit is a step ahead of the
Supreme Court-not always a safe place to be but, at least in this
case, the right place to be.

41 New York Times Co. v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 324, 330 (1971). The author was

co-counsel to the Times in the case.

See generally Oakes, The Doctrineof PriorRestraint Since the PentagonPapers,15
U. MICH. J.L. RF . 497, 498-505 (1982) (discussing origin of prior restraints and Pentagon
42

Papers decision).
41 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
" An exception is Jerome Frank's extraordinarily eloquent, witty and speech-protective
concurring opinion in United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,
concurring), aff'd, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

